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businesses increasingly have replaced traditional employees with independent contractors. Yet
many of these individuals fall outside federal employment law, including Title VII's
antidiscrimination protections. This Note addresses the legal gap in coverage and proposes using
42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstruction-era provision that forbids race discrimination in "mak[ing]
and enforc[ing] contracts," to modernize the workplace antidiscrimination regime to cover these
workers. Drawing on the history and original purpose of the provision, the Note proposes
reforms to § 1981 that would leave it structurally, doctrinally, and theoretically sound.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades, the American workplace has undergone a
fundamental transformation.' Gone are the stable, long-term employment
relationships that prevailed during most of the twentieth century; today, firms
increasingly hire "contingent workers": independent contractors, temporary
and leased workers, and part-time employees.' While many businesses have
reaped benefits from these new arrangements, workers themselves frequently
have suffered. Contingent workers earn less on average than their traditionally
employed counterparts, generally do not receive health insurance or pension
benefits, and enjoy little to no job security.' Moreover, many fall outside the
critical social and economic protections of labor and employment laws. 4 In
distinguishing between "employees," whom these laws protect, and
"independent contractors," whom they do not, courts have applied to these
modern work relationships legal definitions of employment developed in other
eras and for other purposes.' As a result, the broad swath of contingent
workers legally classified as "independent contractors" -largely because their
1. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE
CHANGING WORKPLACE 67 (2004).
2. See U.S. COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS-FINAL REPORT 61
(1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key-workplace/2 ("The use of
independent contractors and part-time, temporary, seasonal, and leased workers has
expanded tremendously in recent years."); Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at
the Millennium: A Historical Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv. 351, 366-67
(2002).
3. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 4, 6 (2005) [hereinafter BLS 2005], available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/conemp.pdf; STONE, supra note i, at 70-83; Kathleen
Barker & Kathleen Christensen, Charting Future Research, in CONTINGENT WORK: AMERICAN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN TRANSITION 306, 316 (Kathleen Barker & Kathleen Christensen
eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONTINGENT WORK]; Roberta Spalter-Roth & Heidi Hartmann,
Gauging the Consequences for Gender Relations, Pay Equity, and the Public Purse, in
CONTINGENT WORK, supra, at 69, 85, 89. One study, for example, found that contingent
workers earn 52% of what noncontingent workers earn. See Barker & Christensen, supra, at
316-17.
4. See Anthony P. Carnevale et al., Contingent Workers and Employment Law, in CONTINGENT
WORK, supra note 3, at 281, 281; Virginia L. duRivage et al., Making Labor Law Work for
Part-Time and Contingent Workers, in CONTINGENT WORK, supra note 3, at 263, 263-80.
S. At common law, the employee/independent contractor distinction governed the availability
of vicarious liability, and it was later imported into statutory interpretation. See Richard R.
Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought To Stop
Trying, 22 BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 295,301-14 (2001).
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employers exert less control over the manner in which they perform their
duties6 - has been excluded entirely from critical workplace regulations.7
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,8 considered one of the most
important pieces of legislation of the past century, offers fundamental
protections for American workers. Yet courts have interpreted Title VII, which
circularly defines those it covers as "individual[s] employed by an employer,"'
not to cover those classified as "independent contractors."" The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)" and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 2 share Title Vii's definition and are thus similarly
limited. Because the legal test to distinguish protected "employees" from
independent contractors is complex, and because statistics about the
contingent workforce do not address that dichotomy, it is impossible to
identify precisely how many American workers lack coverage. But given the
trends indicated by existing data, contingent workers, including independent
contractors, likely represent a substantial and growing portion of the
population.'3
6. To determine coverage under most employment and labor laws, courts use the "common
law agency" test. See discussion infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. Note that those
individuals who fit the legal definition frequently would not describe themselves as
"independent contractors" in ordinary parlance. See infra note 67.
7. Those contingent workers not legally considered "independent contractors," while still
facing challenges in gaining labor and employment law protection, are not categorically
excluded in the same way. Part-time workers, for example, are "employees," see Befort, supra
note 2, at 368, while leased and temporary workers, who are the employees of a temporary
or leasing agency but work on-site at client companies, are considered "employees" of the
agency, the client, or both, see George Gonos, The Contest over "Employer" Status in the
Postwar United States: The Case of Temporary Help Firms, 31 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 81 (1997);
Donald F. Kiesling, Jr., Title VII and the Temporary Employment Relationship, 32 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1 (1997).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe (2000).
9. Id. § 200oC(O.
1o. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (2000).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12,101-12,213 (2000).
13. See Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 153, 158-59 (2003)
(summarizing data on the "large and growing group" of contingent workers). Estimates of
the size of the contingent workforce have ranged from 5% to almost 30% of the total
workforce. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKERS: INCOMES AND BENEFITS LAG
BEHIND THOSE OF THE REST OF WORKFORCE 10 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/heooo76.pdf. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) identified 10.3 million self-
described "independent contractors," representing 7.4% of the workforce. BLS 2005, supra
note 3, at 4. For a more detailed discussion of the limitations of these findings, see infra note
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Moreover, contingent workers have the demographic characteristics of
those who most need antidiscrimination protection. First, they are more likely
than traditional workers to be female and to be black or Hispanic, making
them readier targets of workplace discrimination. 4 Second, because they are
lower-paid, they are at greater risk of falling into poverty if they lose their
jobs.s Nonetheless, Title VII provides no recourse if an employer treats an
independent contractor differently because of her race or sex by, for example,
refusing to hire her, terminating her contract, paying her lower wages, or
harassing her. The ADA and ADEA similarly lack protections for independent
contractors treated differently because of disability or age.
Independent contractors are not entirely without legal remedy, however.
Section 1981, a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 that remains good
law, 6 forbids discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts.
7
Though the Reconstruction Congress passed the statute to alleviate the plight
of freed blacks in the post-Civil War South, courts have breathed new life into
the provision over the past half-century. s At present, § 1981 provides
protection roughly equivalent to that of Title VII to a subset of the independent
contractors whom Title VII excludes: those who suffer race-based disparate
treatment discrimination. Because § 1981 leaves untouched a range of
discriminatory conduct, including nonracial discrimination and disparate
impact discrimination, and because it has a number of procedural limitations,
§ 1981 remains an imperfect remedy.' 9 But the statute's language, origins, and
applications suggest it might be revamped to fill critical gaps in workplace
antidiscrimination law's coverage of independent contractors.
In this Note, I analyze the failure of the federal workplace
antidiscrimination regime to protect independent contractors, and I propose
using a modernized § 1981 to address that failure. In Part I, I explore the
67 and accompanying text. See also Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic
Realities": The Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws To Include
Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REv. 239, 243, 245 (1997).
14. See BLS 2005, supra note 3, at 3 (describing the demographics of those defined as
"contingent workers," though not of those described as "independent contractors"); Anne
E. Polivka, A Profile of Contingent Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Oct. 1996, at io, ii, available
at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1996/io/art2full.pdf; see also Gillian Lester, Careers and
Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 104 (1998); Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 3, at 84.
i. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
16. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a) (2000)).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
18. See infra Section II.A.
19. See infra Section III.A.
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characteristics of the contingent workforce and describe how Title VII excludes
those considered to be "independent contractors."2 In Part II, I describe the
origins of § 1981 and how it has evolved to provide partial coverage for some
independent contractors who fall outside Title VII's scope. In Part III, I discuss
why § 1981's structural and doctrinal limitations currently render it an
inadequate solution to the plight of independent contractors. Finally, in Part
W, I propose a revised vision of § 1981 that both reflects its original purpose
and extends practical antidiscrimination coverage to independent contractors.
I. THE RISE OF CONTINGENT WORK
A. The Contracting-Out Phenomenon
The American workplace is in the midst of a change so profound that some
have called it a "crisis of work."2 ' The model of career employment,
characterized by workers' orderly progression through the internal labor
markets of single firms, has given way to shorter-lived and less secure
contingent jobs.22  Instead of hiring additional traditional employees,
companies today increasingly outsource tasks to peripheral workers, including
temporary and leased workers (whom they procure from a supplying agency)
and independent contractors (who operate by themselves).23 The economic
incentives to contract out are substantial. For many businesses, the greatest
advantage of these nontraditional arrangements is their tremendous flexibility.
Temporary or contract workers are easy to hire and easy to dismiss because
they have short-term contracts and no expectation of continued employment.'
Unlike core employees, whom employers can fire only with difficulty,
contracted workers can be terminated with minimum hassle, at virtually no
20. To streamline my analysis, I refer frequently in this Note to "Title VII" as shorthand for
Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Title VII is the oldest and most frequently invoked of the
three. See infia note 75.
21. Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 523, 523 (1997).
22. See Lester, supra note 14, at 74; see also STONE, supra note 1, at 92 (describing the
contemporary workforce as "boundaryless").
23. See, e.g., STONE, supra note i, at 67; Mark Berger, Unjust Dismissal and the Contingent
Worker: Restructuring Doctrine for the Restructured Employee, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 5-6
(1997); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519,539-40 (2001).
24. See Berger, supra note 23, at 8, 35.
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cost, and with little fear of legal repercussions." Firms therefore can respond
quickly to rises and falls in demand, minimizing the number of extra workers
on their payrolls.26 Contingent workers also cost employers less because their
wages are usually lower than core employees' and they do not receive
benefits 7 Businesses hire contingent workers for a variety of positions -for
example, as janitors, secretaries, construction workers, security guards,
technology consultants, truck drivers, insurance agents, and agricultural
laborers .8
While most scholars recognize that the contingent workforce is sizable and
growing, little reliable information exists about the current number of
contingent workers. Using a conservative measure, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) reported in 2005 that contingent workers now account for up
to 4.1% of the workforce and that workers in "alternative arrangements" (an
overlapping category) account for 1O.7%.3o Many scholars have criticized the
BLS definition of contingency, which relied on perceived job insecurity instead
of the inherent insecurity of the work arrangement, and have found the
measurements generally underinclusive." Other researchers, using a work-
arrangement-based definition, have found that contingent workers represent at
25. Modern legal developments in the at-will employment doctrine have made it more difficult
to fire core employees, who now may sue for unjust dismissal in most state courts. See
STONE, supra note i, at 84. Contracted workers, however, may not. See Berger, supra note 23,
at 8.
26. See Lester, supra note 14, at 97 (stating that contracted workers grant employers "'numerical'
flexibility" because their "episodes of employment can be initiated and terminated, or hours
of work varied, without costly violations of legal rules or customary norms of the
workplace").
27. See id. at 98.
28. Cf. BLS 2005, supra note 3, at 13 tbl.4 (listing occupations and industries of contingent
workers).
29. See Befort, supra note 13, at 158-59; Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 3, at 69
(suggesting the dearth of reliable data). But see BLS 2005, supra note 3, at 1 (reporting that,
under BLS measures, proportions of certain contingent work arrangements had not changed
significantly since 2OOl).
3o. BLS 2005, supra note 3, at 1. Note that the lo.7% figure represents the sum of the
percentages of the four types of alternative arrangements the BLS measured.
31. See, e.g., STONE, supra note i, at 73-74; Barker & Christensen, supra note 3, at 307 (noting
that the "distinction between contingent and nonstandard may eventually provide clarity,
but it complicates the popular understanding of the term 'contingent', which is often
equated with nonstandard relationships that are inherently insecure"); Lester, supra note 14,
at 82.
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least 16% of the labor force and possibly as much as 29%.3" Because of
definitional ambiguities and methodological challenges, counting contingent
workers has proven highly difficult,33 and disagreement over their numbers is
likely to persist.
Contingent workers are a diverse group in terms of their occupation, level
of skill, pay, and demographic characteristics. 4 Nevertheless, certain trends are
observable across studies. First, contingent workers are less secure than their
traditionally employed counterparts in terms of job stability and socio-
economic status. 3' To be sure, the flexibility of alternative work arrangements
substantially advantages some workers: parents who wish to work while they
raise children, students while they attend school, the elderly while in semi-
retirement, and the inexperienced while acquiring human capital. 36 Yet these
workers are also at risk of arbitrary dismissal, as contingent relationships are
easier to terminate than traditional employment.37 Moreover, even when they
are working, contingent workers tend to be lower-paid and receive fewer
benefits than classic employees,38 rendering them less able to cope with the
32. Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 3, at 77-78. The 29% figure is obtained by adding the
16% figure for contingent workers to the 13% of workers the authors deem "questionable."
Id.; see also Barker & Christensen, supra note 3, at 308; Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the
Contingent Workforce: The Kty
, 
Challenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 863, 867-
68 (1995) (estimating that 25% to 30% of the workforce was contingent between 198o and
1993).
33. See STONE, supra note 1, at 72-74 ("The empirical debate reflects ... [both] disagreement
about what constitutes precarious employment and disagreement about how to measure
it."); Barker & Christensen, supra note 3, at 3o6 ("No universally accepted definition of
contingency exists.").
34. See Michael J. Hely, The Impact of Sturgis on Bargaining Poiver for Contingent Workers in the
U.S. Labor Market, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 295, 300-01 (2003); Stewart J. Schwab, The
Diversity of Contingent Workers and the Need fr Nuanced Policy, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 915,
916-20 (1995).
35. See Barker & Christensen, supra note 3, at 317 (stating that contingent workers "are at
particular economic risk").
36. See Befort, supra note 13, at 161; Lester, supra note 14, at 74-75 (describing the view that
"contingent work is a symptom of a well-functioning labor market that matches individuals'
skills, preferences, and aptitudes with the needs of employers"); id. at 94 (describing the
view that contingent work promotes acquisition of human capital and allows workers to
supplement income in retirement).
37. See Lester, supra note 14, at 107 (describing the vulnerability of contingent workers to
arbitrary employment actions); Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Impermanent
Employment and the Paradox of Productivity, 26 STETSON L. REv. 1, 29 (1996) (stating that
"[p]rotection against arbitrary dismissal under the developing common law of wrongful
termination" is "unavailable" to part-time workers).
38. See sources citcd supra note 3.
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unwanted periods of unemployment they are more likely to experience.3 9 In
light of the economic gap between contingent and noncontingent work,
scholars have begun to describe the American labor force as "two-tiered,"4
with one tier motivated by "prospects of advancement, participation, and job
security" and the other by "insecurity and fear."41
Second, contingent workers are more likely than traditional employees to
be female and to be black or Hispanic. 42 A standard explanation for the
prevalence of women in the contingent workforce is that they choose more
flexible schedules to accommodate their family responsibilities .4' A parallel
argument for minorities is that they choose contingent work to gain skills.4
Yet these accounts are undermined by the finding that most contingent
workers would prefer stable, long-term employment over the jobs they have. 45
A more disturbing hypothesis is that women and minorities have been
segregated into the increasingly contingent low-skilled, low-paid jobs.46
Whatever the cause, the two-tiered workforce appears to be organized along
race and gender lines - leading one scholar to call it a caste system. 47
39. Cf Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 3, at 92-94 (describing contingent workers'
disproportionate dependence on welfare).
40. Befort, supra note 13, at 178; see also Alison Davis-Blake & Brian Uzzi, Determinants of
Employment Externalization: A Study of Temporary Workers and Independent Contractors, 38
ADMIN. SCI. q. 195, 195 (1993) ("Extensive reliance on temporary workers may create two
classes of employees: permanent workers with relatively secure, high-paying employment
and temporary workers who have only sporadic, low-paying work.").
41. Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the Contingent Work Force, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
739, 744 (1995) (describing American employment as "more and more becoming a tale of
two cities"); Lester, supra note 14, at 1o5 (describing the segmentationist view that there are
"good" and "bad" jobs with structural barriers between them).
42. See supra note 14. There is also evidence that in some areas independent contractors in
particular are more likely to be disabled than are traditional employees. Peter David Blanck
et al., The Emerging Workforce of Entrepreneurs with Disabilities: Preliminary Study of
Entrepreneurship in Iowa, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1583, 1596 (2000) (citing a study to that effect).
43. See Lester, supra note 14, at 93-94 (describing the benefits of the flexibility of contingent
work); Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 3, at 89.
44. See Lester, supra note 14, at 94.
45. See BLS 2005, supra note 3, at 3; see also Lester, supra note 14, at 77 ("In the absence of a
stronger explanation of ... persistent [wage] gaps, we are left to speculate that there is a
nontrivial class of workers who, despite genuine motivation and capabilities, are unable to
secure stable employment, and have lower pay, benefits, and opportunities for advancement
than other workers with the same preferences, human capital, and endowments.").
46. Lester, supra note 14, at 1O4; see also Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, supra note 3, at 89.
47. RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-
TIME AND SUBCONTRACTOR WORKFORCE 68 (1989); see also Befort, supra note 13, at 178
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Though contingent workers are a heterogeneous group, data show that
they tend to be precariously employed, socio-economically vulnerable, female,
or nonwhite. In other words, they are a population for whom
antidiscrimination protection is likely to be critical. As the next Section
describes, however, the sizable subset of this workforce that courts deem
"independent contractors" has no recourse under Title VII, the ADA, or the
ADEA. As the number of such workers mounts, this antidiscrimination law
"black hole" will become an increasingly urgent problem.
48
B. Independent Contractors and the Antidiscrimination Law "Black Hole"
A wide range of labor and employment legislation extends only to
"employees," leaving "independent contractors" outside the regulatory zone.
For example, most unemployment insurance4 9 and workers' compensation
plans"0 do not cover independent contractors; those hiring independent
contractors do not make payroll tax payments for them;"1 the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) does not mandate certain working conditions or
overtime pay for them; 2 and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does
not protect their unionization. 3 Similar restrictions apply to the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 4 the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(suggesting that contingent work may be seen as "second-class citizenship"); Hiatt, supra
note 41, at 744 (noting the division of the workforce along race and gender lines).
48. See Befort, supra note 13, at 164; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Should Some Independent
Contractors Be Redefined as "Employees" Under Labor Law?, 33 VILL. L. REv. 989, 994 (1988)
("[I]f the existing legal definitions of employee continue to apply, labor and employment
law will apply to a diminishing universe of legal relations.").
49. For example, the federal definition of employee for the purposes of unemployment benefits
would not include most independent contractors. See I.R.C. § 33o6(i) (2000).
5o. See Carlson, supra note 5, at 367 n.381 (noting that courts in many states restrict workers'
compensation coverage to common law employees). For a sampling of state laws, see CAL.
LAB. CODE § 5705 (West 2003); and N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 2(4) (McKinney 2005).
51. See Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. 3d 1187, 119o & n.2 (9th Cir. 1996), affd on reh'g en
banc, 12o F.3d ioo6 (9th Cir. 1997).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000) (extending coverage to "any individual employed by an
employer"); see Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1947) (applying
the common law test for distinguishing between independent contractors and employers
under the FLSA).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000) (explicitly excluding from protection "any individual having the
status of an independent contractor").
54. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2000) (defining "employee" to have the same meaning as under the
FLSA); see Carnevale et al., supra note 4, at 297.
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(OSHA)," and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA). 56
And despite expansive application in many other respects, Title VII, the ADA,
and the ADEA have been interpreted to guarantee only to traditional
employees, and not to independent contractors, the right to be free from
workplace discrimination.5 7 Because complying with this elaborate regulatory
structure is burdensome and costly, money-conscious firms have incentives to
hire independent contractors who fall outside .the system's legal strictures s8
The unfortunate result for workers, however, is that they do not get the rights,
benefits, and work conditions -including a discrimination-free workplace-
that the statutes were designed to ensure. With regard to Title VII, this
phenomenon is at odds with Congress's ambitious goal in enacting the statute:
to guarantee all Americans access to a workplace free from discriminatory
barriers.
Determining who is an "employee" under Title VII and who is an
"independent contractor" is a complicated task-so much so that many
workers and even their employers cannot be sure which label applies. Because
the statute defines those subject to its coverage circularly as "individual[s]
employed by an employer,"5' 9 courts have grappled with several tests for
distinguishing covered from uncovered workers. 6° Until fairly recently, courts
had split over whether to apply the "common law agency" test, which focused
on the putative employer's right to control the worker,6' or the more expansive
"economic realities" test, which considered a wide range of factors tending to
55. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2000) (defining "employee" as anyone "who is employed in a business
of his employer which affects commerce").
56. 29 U.S.C. § 1OO2(6) (2000) (extending coverage to "any individual employed by an
employer").
57. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Nancy E. Dowd,
The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 75
(1984).
58. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 13, at 163 n.82; Gonos, supra note 7, at 83-84 (describing the legal
vacuum as critical to the proliferation of these work arrangements); Jennifer Middleton,
Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 557, 571 (1996).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(f) (2000).
6o. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (describing ERISA's
definition of "employee," which is identical to Title VII's, as "completely circular" and
noting that it "explains nothing").
61. See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339-41 (lith Cir. 1982); Smith v. Dutra
Trucking Co., 41o F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd, 580 F.2d 1o54 (9 th Cir. 1978).
For an excellent history of the origins of the common law agency test, see Carlson, supra
note 5, at 302-34.
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demonstrate a worker's economic dependence on the putative employer.62 In
1992, the Supreme Court intervened to impose the more restrictive common
law agency test, ruling that this test should apply whenever statutes failed to
define "employee" specifically, regardless of the statute's purpose.6" Though
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden concerned ERISA's definition of
"employee," subsequent courts have adopted its reasoning in the context of
Title VII and other employment discrimination statutes.6 4
Many civil rights and labor scholars have decried the common law test as
underinclusive and counter to Title VII's broad, remedial purpose. s In
practice, courts applying the test have frequently characterized
antidiscrimination plaintiffs as "independent contractors" and thus denied
them coverage.66 Once a court finds an individual to be an independent
contractor, its inquiry ends, no matter how egregious the alleged conduct or
how well substantiated the claim of discrimination.
Though it is virtually impossible to obtain data on the population of
individuals who would be deemed independent contractors under the common
law agency test, 6 7 it seems reasonable to assume that they share many
62. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying the economic
realities test to Title VII); Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831-32.
63. Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23.
64. E.g., Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., loI F. 3 d 487 (7 th Cir. 1996) (Title VII); Wilde
v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F. 3 d 103, 1o5-o6 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); Frankel v. Bally, Inc.,
987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (ADEA); see also Maltby & Yamada, supra note 13, at 253
("The Darden decision has significantly influenced judicial interpretations under Title VII
and ADEA.").
6S. See Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor Law: An
Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 187, 187-88 (1999) ("To interpret the definition of the class of workers protected by
modern labor legislation without mentioning the statutory purposes, but solely by reference
to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century judicial doctrine determining the scope of liability of
coach owners for the injuries inflicted by horse owners' drivers on third parties, may seem
like a hell of a way to run a twenty-first century railroad. ... ); see also Carnevale et al.,
supra note 4, at 291 (stating that Darden "fails to reflect the economic realities of today's
marketplace"); Dowd, supra note 57, at 76 ("[T] he common law test fundamentally conflicts
with the prophylactic goals of Title VII.").
66. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F. 3 d 111 (2d Cir. 2000);
Alexander, ioi F. 3 d 487; EEOC v. Catholic Knights Ins. Soc'y, 915 F. Supp. 25, 27-28 (N.D.
Ill. 1996); Dutra Trucking Co., 41o F. Supp. 513; infra note 142 (providing examples of
female independent contractors excluded from Title VII because of this test).
67. Because the test is complicated and fact-sensitive, it is difficult to determine a survey
respondent's status based on the answers to specific questions. As a result, it is near-
impossible to produce precise statistics about how many workers would be considered
independent contractors by law. While some studies have generated data about those who
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characteristics of the contingent workforce as a whole: in particular, that a
significant portion is female or nonwhite. If these generalizations hold, Title
VII not only fails to protect vulnerable workers, but also creates incentives for
businesses to place even greater numbers of workers in that vacuum. So long as
current law permits employers to evade antidiscrimination liability by
contracting out instead of hiring employees, it is economically rational for
them to do so. While the majority of employers, who do not intend to
discriminate, nonetheless might structure their work relationships in this way
because they fear frivolous lawsuits, 68  some might hire independent
contractors so that they can discriminate with impunity. 69 This phenomenon
betrays Title VII's promise to protect "every American's right ... to get a job
... without arbitrary discrimination."7
self-describe as independent contractors in the conventional (not legal) sense or those who
consider themselves self-employed, these groups fall far short of the universe of workers the
common law agency test excludes from employment protections. The BLS, for example, has
attempted in periodic studies to gather information about the population who described
themselves as "independent contractors, independent consultants, [and] freelance workers."
BLS 2005, supra note 3, at 2 tbl.A. The data in the study, while helpful, fall far short of
describing the population of people whom courts would consider to be independent
contractors. See Sharon R. Cohany et al., Counting the Workers: Results of a First Survey, in
CONTINGENT WORK, supra note 3, at 41, 45 ("[N]o attempt was made to identify the legal
aspects of persons' employment relationships."); Maltby & Yamada, supra note 13, at 245
("[B]ecause the BLS survey was not designed with statutory enforcement in mind, it is
impossible to determine whether those who fall into the group labeled by the BLS as
independent contractors would be similarly labeled under the current tests used by courts in
determining coverage under discrimination laws."). Spalter-Roth and Hartmann performed
a study using more descriptive categories of work arrangement and a richer data source and
found, for example, that roughly equal numbers of men and women are "self-employed"
contingent workers. Spalter-Roth and Hartmann, supra note 3, at 84. This study also does
not address the legal status of workers.
68. Employment discrimination lawsuits are proliferating. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 429,432 (2004); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature
ofEmployment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 983-84 (1991).
69. Another possibility is that employers themselves do not intend to discriminate but fear that
they cannot control potentially discriminatory supervisors. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 216 (1958) (describing a principal's liability even for unauthorized tortious
conduct by an agent). Either way, contracting out diminishes a business's legal risk. The
argument for contracting out minority and female workers is remarkably similar to the
argument for contracting out toxic industrial processes: both, when performed "in-house,"
expose the firm to liability that does not arise when these functions are "outsourced." Cf
Richard R.W. Brooks, Liability and Organizational Choice, 45 J.L. & ECON. 91, 92 (2002)
("[I]ncreases in liability will encourage firms to contract out risky activities .... ").
70. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 1963 PUB. PAPERS
483, 493 (June 19, 1963); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 7, 78 Star.
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Scholars have criticized courts' treatment of independent contractors across
the spectrum of labor and employment law,7' proposing a variety of alternative
approaches for sensibly determining which independent contractors warrant
which type of protection.7" When it comes to antidiscrimination policy,
however, there is a strong consensus that no salient differences exist between
independent contractors and employees, or among independent contractors,
that resonate with the regime's expansive remedial goals. 73 These goals, rooted
in today's firmly entrenched antidiscrimination principle, dictate that there
should be no categories of workers against whom employers can discriminate
with impunity. 74 But while the American commitment to a discrimination-free
workplace has matured only in recent decades, it is a concept with earlier
origins.
241, 253 (labeling Title VII of the Act "Equal Employment Opportunity"); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971) (stating that Congress's objective in enacting Title
VI1 was the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" based
on race).
71. See Linder, supra note 65, at 19o ("[Adjudicators] routinely draw the line between covered
employees and excluded non-employees without considering why they are engaged in
charting and policing these boundaries, why some workers fall on one side rather than the
other, or what the real-world consequences are to those whom they place beyond the
pale.").
72. See Carlson, supra note 5, at 358-6o (discussing ERISA); id. at 360-63 (FLSA); Maria
O'Brien Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent Employment, 52 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 849 (1995) (advocating caution in general); Linder, supra note 65, at 224, 227-
28 (NLRA); Perritt, supra note 48, at 1o24-25 (NLRA).
73. See Hylton, supra note 72, at 861 ("One may properly infer from the existence of, for
example, the ADA and Title VII, that a national consensus exists about the importance of
bias-free workplaces -that is, about the availability of employment without discrimination
to all Americans. One cannot draw the same conclusion about benefits from, for example,
ERISA . . . .This is a critical distinction."); Maltby & Yamada, supra note 13, at 265
("[G]eneralized arguments against regulation [of independent contractors] do not apply
with the same force, if at all, to discrimination law."); Perritt, supra note 48, at 1o24 (calling
antidiscrimination law the "clearest case for broadening the definition of employee to
include independent contractors").
74. See MICHAEL 1. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 7
(1966) (describing "the premise that the law can and should be invoked against racial
discrimination in employment," to which "[o]ur nation now seems irreversibly committed
... and rightly so").
183
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
II. SECTION 1981 AND THE RIGHT TO CONTRACT
While Title VII is the country's most frequently invoked workplace
antidiscrimination law,71 it is neither the only one nor the oldest. Enacted in
the Reconstruction era, the Civil Rights Act of 186676 granted citizenship to the
freed slaves and provided the following guarantee, as codified today at 42
U.S.C. §; 1981(a):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.77
Following its enactment, the section's sweeping prohibitions "underwent
nearly a century of desuetude, '78 overshadowed by the Fourteenth Amendment
and limited to prohibitions on state action.7 9 In a pair of cases in the 196os and
1970s, however, the Supreme Court "spectacularly revived" the provision by
extending it to purely private conduct.8s In the years since, § 1981's "make and
enforce contracts" clause has played an active role in modern
75. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 68, at 985 n.3 (stating that Title VHI claims
represented roughly 8o% of total employment discrimination claims during the period
studied).
76. 14 Star. 27. The Act also included a provision, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000),
forbidding discrimination related to the ownership and sale of property. The Civil Rights
Act of 1871, ch. 22, S 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13, contained a provision, now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2000), providing a federal civil remedy for certain violations of constitutional rights.
77. 42 UoS.C. § 1981(a). Note that this is not the precise wording in the original Civil Rights
Act. In response to concerns that it was not authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment,
Congress reenacted the provision after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification in the
Enforcement Act of 187o, ch. 114, §§ 16, 18, 16 Star. 140, 144. The 187o reenactment differed
from the original 1866 Act in two important respects: it substituted the words "all persons"
for "citizens, of every race and color," and it omitted the language about equal property
rights, which was reenacted separately in what is now § 1982. Id.; see Doe v. Kamehameha
Sch., 416 F.3 d 1025, 1031 ( 9 th Cir. 2005).
78. Kamehameha Sch., 416 F. 3d at 1032.
79. George Rutherglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused,
2003 SuP. CT. REV. 303, 305.
8o. In Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968), the Court extended § 1982 to private action; in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 16o, 170 (1976), it similarly extended § 1981.
184
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:170 20o6
FROM EMPLOYMENT TO CONTRACT
antidiscrirnination law, where it serves primarily as a supplement to many race-
based Title VII claims.8 ' Yet because the statute applies on its face more
broadly to all contractual relationships, its literal coverage also reaches
independent contractors who lack a valid "employment" relationship under
Title VII doctrine. The provision therefore grants some of those individuals the
opportunity to bring the precise claims that Title VII currently denies them. A
survey of recent discrimination suits reveals that independent contractors
indeed have begun bringing such claims, sometimes successfully.
82
As this handful of successful claims illustrates, § 1981 provides a partial
remedy to the gap in Title VII's coverage of independent contractors. Because
of structural and doctrinal constraints, § 1981, in its current form, cannot fill
that gap entirely. But the provision may be reshaped to fit the modern
workplace by embracing the ideal of § 1981's original proponents: the
protection of personal dignity and equal citizenship.
A. Section 1981's Origins
While the Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished
slavery, blacks in the post-war South remained largely unable to enjoy their
newly acquired freedom. The Black Codes enacted by many Southern states,
combined with persistent private prejudice, imposed such "onerous disabilities
and burdens" ' that many freedmen continued to live under conditions of near-
servitude. Confronted by reports of exploitation and degradation of former
slaves, Senator Lyman Trumbull introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
declaring: "This measure is intended to give effect to [the Thirteenth
81. Karen M. Blum, Section 1981 Revisited: Looking Beyond Runyon and Patterson, 32 How. L.J. 1,
12-13 (1989).
82. After conducting exhaustive case searches, I reviewed more than one hundred cases
involving § 1981 claims brought by plaintiffs whose employee/independent contractor status
was in doubt. Though I did not conduct an empirical analysis of my results, I draw general
conclusions throughout the Note based on this study. As far as I know, no one else has
analyzed these cases as a body.
83. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872); see also CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th
Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 95,
121 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter DEBATES] (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("[T]he
insurrectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen . . . They deny them
certain rights, subject them to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very
restrictions which were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of slavery, and
before it was abolished.").
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Amendment] and secure to all persons within the United States practical
freedom."8 '
In many respects, the Act's proponents focused on the practical and
immediate goal of alleviating Southern blacks' poverty, an effect of the
lingering and pervasive discrimination that denied them economically
productive work.8" As the Reconstruction Congress was well aware, intolerable
labor conditions prevailed throughout the South, posing severe barriers for
freed slaves who attempted to sell their labor for wages. 86 Frequently, their
former masters refused to contract with them altogether, sometimes acting in
concert with other local landowners.8" When Southern whites did contract
with freedmen, many used the labor contract itself to restore conditions as
onerous as those under slavery.88 Using the contracts as vehicles, landowners
fixed wages, forbade laborers from pursuing work elsewhere, and coerced work
through corporal punishment8s The framers of the Civil Rights Act were
acutely aware of these contract-related abuses and understood that they
nullified in practice the freedom that the Thirteenth Amendment guaranteed in
principle: "Do you call that man free who cannot choose his own employer, or
84. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 121
(statement of Sen. Trumbull).
85. See id. at 1159, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 171 (statement of Rep. Windom)
("[The Act's] object is to secure to a poor, weak class of laborers the right to make contracts
for their labor, the power to enforce the payment of their wages, and the means of holding
and enjoying the proceeds of their toil.").
86. See CARL SCHURZ, REPORT OF MAj. GEN. CARL SCHURZ ON CONDITION OF THE SOUTH, S.
ExEc. Doc. No. 39-2 (1865) [hereinafter SCHURZ REPORT], reprinted in DEBATES, supra note
83, at 87; see also Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 437, 485-86 (1989).
87. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 1159-6o (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra
note 83, at 171 (statement of Rep. Windom); Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of
Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN.
L. REV. 273, 286-91 (1999); Barry Sullivan, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Historical
Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 552
(1989).
88. Sullivan, supra note 87, at 554; see also REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. REP. No. 39-30, at 123 (1st Sess. 1866) ("There is a disposition on
the part of [white] citizens to secure, as far as possible, the same control over the freedmen
by contracts which [the whites] possessed when they held them as slaves.").
89. See SCHURz REPORT, supra note 86, at 21-22, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 89
(describing "ingenious" contractual schemes used to "make free labor compulsory");
Sullivan, supra note 87, at 554-55; VanderVelde, supra note 86, at 487-88.
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name the wages for which he will work?"9 By guaranteeing the freedmen the
same right to "make and enforce contracts" as white citizens, the Act made
such practices illegal. Ultimately, proponents hoped to usher in a new
Southern labor regime, in which the labor contract could facilitate blacks'
"practical freedom" instead of their oppression. 9'
Yet the framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had an even loftier goal:
guaranteeing to blacks the fundamental rights of citizenship. 92 The freedman's
inability to work was but a visible and painful manifestation of his deeper
problem -the negation of his human dignity. When Senator Trumbull first
presented the bill to the Senate, he spoke little of the economic condition of
freed slaves. Rather, he invoked the Declaration of Independence, the original
Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment, and Blackstone's Commentaries to
enunciate an ideal of civil liberty: "the liberty to which every citizen is entitled,"
the deprivation of which is "an unjust encroachment upon his liberty" and "a
badge of servitude which, by the Constitution, is prohibited."9 3 The right to
make and enforce contracts, as well as the rights to sue, to give evidence, to buy
and sell property, and others, were "necessary incidents" to the fundamental
rights of life, liberty, security, and property.9 4 For the state to guarantee these
rights to some of its citizens and not to others constituted an active intrusion
into the rightful freedom of the deprived citizens. 9 In the eyes of the Act's
proponents, it brought to fruition the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of
slavery, which they claimed provided the authority for its enactment.
9 6
go. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 116o (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 171
(statement of Rep. Windom); see id. at 632, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 140
(statement of Rep. Moulton) ("The object of the bill is to provide... [that] where a State
says, as many do in the South, that the black man shall not make contracts, that the black
man shall not enjoy the fruits of his labor, .... that such discrimination shall not exist .... ).
91. Id. at 474, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 121 (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see
Sullivan, supra note 87, at 549; cf. VanderVelde, supra note 86, at 437 (presenting a
comprehensive "labor vision" of the Thirteenth Amendment).
92. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 599-600 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83,
at 136-37 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) ("[The bill is] intended to ...guaranty to every
person of every color the same civil rights. . . . [A]II its provisions are aimed at the
accomplishment of that one object.").
93. Id. at 474, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 121 (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Other
members of Congress shared his vision. See, e.g., id. at 1152, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note
83, at 169 (statement of Rep. Thayer).
94. Id. at 1833, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 207 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
95. See id. at 474, reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83, at 121 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
96. See id. ("Liberty and slavery are opposite terms ...."); cf. Karst, supra note 21, at 531 ("The
legal conditions of free men ... came to be defined in contrast to slavery .... [W]ork was a
medium through which a free man might demonstrate that he was a citizen.").
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Congress as a whole, however, disputed the Act's constitutionality.
Throughout the debate, detractors argued that the Thirteenth Amendment
ended slavery but did no more, and that the Act's capacious guarantees
unconstitutionally intruded upon state sovereignty.9 7 Though the defenders
prevailed and enacted the law, Congress subsequently took measures to ensure
that the Act rested upon an incontrovertible constitutional foundation: it
passed the Fourteenth Amendment and, after ratification, reenacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 in the Enforcement Act of 1870.98
Because of this intertwined history, scholars have looked to the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 to help give meaning to the Fourteenth Amendment.99 In
particular, some contend that the Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause was intended to constitutionalize those rights enumerated in the 1866
Act, which it merely expressed in a more "compendious""1  or even "delphic"''°
manner. During the first century of § 1981's existence, judicial interpretation
tied the statute to its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart -and thus similarly
limited the Act's reach to state (and not private) action.' This "triumph of the
state action interpretation" of the 1866 Act went virtually unquestioned for
almost loo years, severely limiting the utility of the rights it guaranteed.° 3
In 1968, the Supreme Court suddenly brought the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 "back to life."1"4 In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Court
97. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 1st Sess. 1121 (1866), reprinted in DEBATES, supra note 83,
at 166 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (arguing that Congress had no power to "enter the
domain of a State, and destroy its police regulations with regard to the punishment inflicted
upon negroes").
98. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-
1982 (2000)).
99. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, lOi YALE L.J. 1385,
1410-25 (1992); Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 313 (calling "undeniable" that Section 1 of the
Amendment and section 1 of the Act have "common goals and structure").
loo. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 313.
lol. Harrison, supra note 99, at 1409.
102. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 because it
reached private conduct, which the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress authority
to regulate. In Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 115 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1885), the Court
applied this reasoning to limit the scope of the 1866 Act.
103. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 322. Other than a few cases, "it does not appear that any...
Supreme Court decision before 1952 focused on the question of whether private
discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts is actionable under § 1981." Jack
M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L.
REv. 981, 996 (2002).
104. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 330.
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broke the link between the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, finding
that § 1982 (codifying the Act's prohibition on discrimination in the sale or
rental of property) extended to "all racial discrimination, private as well as
public," and was "a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment."' ° Several years later, in Runyon v. McCrary, the
Court explicitly applied its analysis to § 1981.1° 6 In both opinions, the Court
relied oil the provisions' sweeping language and the 1866 Act's legislative
history to confirm Congress's intent to reach the private business transactions
of individuals." 7 Since Jones and Runyon, the Court repeatedly has endorsed
this interpretation of sections 1981 and 1982."° 8 The importance of Jones and
Runyon to § 1981's development cannot be overstated; it is "the fulcrum on
which the history of Section 1981 turns."'10 9
B. Section 1981 Today
With its application to private discrimination firmly settled, § 1981 has
played a critical and increasing role in race-based employment discrimination
litigation. Following Runyon, plaintiffs began bringing § 1981 claims as
complements to other statutory claims of race discrimination; a handful even
invoked the provision's protection against discrimination in contractual
relationships to which Title VII did not apply.' ° The provision's utility
suffered a setback when the Supreme Court interpreted it to apply only to
contract formation and enforcement, and not to post-formation discriminatory
conduct, such as discharge or harassment."' Congress promptly overrode the
decision with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.112 Today, § 1981's "visionary
principles" stand poised, doctrinally speaking, to play a highly active role in
105. 392 U.S. 409,413 (1968).
1o6. 427 U.S. 16o, 168, 170-71 (1976) ("[A] Negro's ... right to 'make and enforce contracts' is
violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the
same opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to white offerees.").
107. See id. at 170-72;Jones, 392 U.S. at 427-29.
1o8. E.g., Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 66o-62 (1987).
log. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 307; see also Beermann, supra note 103, at 997.
110. See, e.g., Zaklarna v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F.2d 291 (iith Cir. 1988); Nanavati v. Burdette
Tomlin Mem'l Hosp., Civil Nos. 83-0794, 84-1790, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23822 (D.N.J.
June 23, 1986); Gutierrez v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., No. C 78-1863 SC, 1979 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12727 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 1979).
ill. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 179-82 (1989).
112. 42 U.S.C. § i9 8i(b) (2000).
189
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ensuring racial equality. Yet it remains a provision whose "theoretical coverage
vastly exceeds its actual application.1 13
In the fifteen years since Congress reaffirmed the importance of § 1981, the
provision's role in antidiscrimination law has been pervasive but
supplementary. From 1988 to 2003, for example, of the 19% of all employment
discrimination cases that featured a § 1981 claim, only 0.7% involved a § 1981
claim standing alone.114 Civil rights plaintiffs most frequently invoke the
section's contract clause in conjunction with Title VII claims for workplace race
discrimination. "' Courts presented with both claims generally analyze the
§ 1981 claim in tandem with, and using the same framework as, the companion
statutory claim. 1,6 In other words, if the plaintiffs evidence meets the legal
standards used to enforce the primary claim, he also prevails on his § 1981
claim."17 For disparate treatment suits under Title VII, the appropriate legal
framework is the burden-shifting scheme the Court has set forth under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and its progeny. "8 Because most § 1981
claims are brought with Title VII claims, the McDonnell Douglas scheme has
become the dominant doctrinal test for both. For the relatively rarer workplace
harassment suit under Title VII, courts instead evaluate a companion § 1981
claim according to harassment doctrine. " 9 In either case, "the substantive
113. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 350.
114. E-mail from Laura Beth Nielsen, Research Fellow, Am. Bar Found., and Assistant Professor
of Sociology, Nw. Univ., to author (May 26, 2006, 17:33 EST) (on file with author). The e-
mail reports preliminary findings from a national study of employment civil rights claims
filed in federal court from 1988 to 2003. The study analyzed data obtained from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
115. See Blum, supra note 81, at 12-14.
ni6. See, e.g., Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 176 (7th Cir. 1996); Wright v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. 1364, 1376 (D. Kan. 1995); see also Blum, supra
note 81, at 14; Maltby & Yamada, supra note 13, at 256.
117. See Blum, supra note 81, at 13.
'IS. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981). For a description of the framework, see infra notes 163-165 and
accompanying text.
119. To constitute a violation of Title VII, harassment based on sex or race must be so severe and
pervasive as to alter adversely the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5io U.S. 17, 21 (1993); see also
Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying this framework
to a racial harassment claim brought by an independent contractor). Section 1981 has a
similarly chameleonic nature when it accompanies constitutional equal protection claims.
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003).
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scope of [§ 1981] is generally viewed as coextensive with Title VII in the
employment context."..2
Though § i98i offers little independent substantive benefit to plaintiffs
alleging race discrimination in employment, it can confer other significant
advantages. 2 ' Unlike Title VII, § 198i has no damage caps onl compensatory
and punitive damages and so permits much larger awards. 2 ' Section 1981 has
no administrative exhaustion requirement. '2 3 For many types of suits in certain
jurisdictions, § 1981 has a longer statute of limitations than does Title VII.' 4
Finally, § 1981 specifies no minimum number of employees a defendant
employer must have to fall within the statute's jurisdiction.' 5 Because of these
procedural differences, a plaintiff occasionally has only a § 1981 claim, even
though a Title VII claim otherwise would be appropriate."26 If the plaintiff
brings the § 1981 claim without a companion statutory claim to provide a
doctrinal framework, the court nonetheless analyzes the § 1981 claim as it
would the phantom claim.'27 In other words, for the large majority of instances
in which § 1981 is invoked, courts do not theorize it independently from Title
VII in any meaningful way.
12o. Blum, supra note 81, at 13.
121. For an excellent surnmary of these advantages, see Maltby & Yamada, supra note 13, at 256-
57.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2000) (limiting awards under Title VII); see Johnson v. Ry. Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 46o (1975) (describing remedies under § 1981).
123. See, e.g., Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F. 3d 726, 732 (7 th Cir. 2004).
124. For formation-related contract claims under § 1981, which were available even before the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts continue to apply state statutes of limitations (in contrast to
post-formation contract claims, which are governed by the four-year statute of limitations in
28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) (2000)). See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382
(2004); see also Thinker Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., No. 97-00300, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4875 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2005). Linking § 1981 to state statutes of
limitations sometimes provides procedural advantages to § 1981 litigants (for example,
when the state statute of limitations permits more time than the federal statute), but it also
makes bringing § 1981 claims more complex because it is difficult for plaintiffs to know
which statute to apply to their own cases.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000); Joh1izoii, 421 U.S. 454 (assuming that § 1981 covers contracts of
small employers exempt from Title VII).
126. Such a situation would arise if, for example, Title VII's shorter statute of limitations barred
a claim while § 1981's statute did not. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d
1143, 1144 n.* (4 th Cir. 1986), affid in part and vacated in part, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
127. See, e.g., Riley v. Emory Univ., 136 F. App'x 264, 266 (11th Cir. 2005); Perry v. Woodward,
199 F.3d 1126, 1135 (ioth Cir. 1999).
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C. Independent Contractor Plaintiffs and 5 1981
While plaintiffs alleging discrimination most frequently invoke § 1981 in
conjunction with, or as a substitute for, a valid Title VII claim, a growing
number of independent contractors have brought § 1981 discrimination claims
when their status has rendered them wholly outside Title VII's coverage.
Though one commentator speculated in 1991 that bringing a § 1981
discrimination suit for private business conduct was "[a]t best... an academic
exercise," litigation over the past fifteen years has demonstrated otherwise.12
8
With increasing frequency, independent contractors are bringing
discrimination suits under § 1981, and courts are reaching the merits of
discrimination claims that they would have dismissed under Title VII. A small
but not insubstantial number of independent contractors have prevailed on
these claims. "9
In Carey v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., for example, an African-
American independent contractor who was denied a FedEx delivery route sued
for discrimination under § 1981.130 Don Carey had expressed his interest in
obtaining a route, made a number of preparations, and received repeated
assurances from FedEx that he would receive his route shortly.'31 Yet the
company held him off for eighteen months, while awarding to white applicants
routes that became available.13 Because Carey was not an applicant for
employment, his suit could not have gone forward under Title VII. The court
analyzed his claim under § 1981, however, and found that Carey's evidence was
sufficient to survive the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The case
settled shortly before trial.133 Similarly, in Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a
Hispanic independent contractor sued Wal-Mart under § 1981, alleging that
the company had created a hostile work environment. 3 4 The plaintiff and his
small staff had been hired to maintain the parking lots at a Wal-Mart store.
Shortly after he started working, his supervisor and other employees spray-
painted a derogatory comment on the parking lot (and would not let him paint
128. Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1287
(1991). Suggs made this comment after Patterson and before the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.
129. See infra note 184.
130. 321 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
131. Id. at 905-12.
132. Id.
133. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Carey, 321 F. Supp. 2d 902 (No. 2:02-CV-010 52).
134. 178 F.3d 8 (xst Cir. 1999).
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over it), used racial slurs, and told him that they did not like "[his] kind."'3
Eventually, Wal-Mart terminated his contract. '36 Because the plaintiff was not
an employee, a Title VII hostile work environment claim never would have
reached a jury. Yet the jury that heard this contractor's § 1981 claim awarded
him $650,OOo. 137
Carey and Danco suggest that § 1981 has filled the gaps in Title VII's
coverage successfully for a subset of independent contractors. Even when
independent contractors do not prevail on their § 1981 claims, the opportunity
to receive meaningful judicial review represents a vast improvement over Title
ViI's indifference.
III. SECTION 1981 AS AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION
A. Section 1981 's Structural Limitations
In the above cases and a handful of others, § 1981, practically speaking, has
extended Title VII employment discrimination principles to independent
contractors beyond that statute's reach. But § 1981 in its current form remains
an imperfect solution to the coverage shortfalls of Title VII.
The most glaring problem with § 1981 as interpreted is that it prohibits
only discrimination based on race or ethnicity and not discrimination based on
sex, national origin, religion, age, or disability-all protected classifications
under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.' 38 Section 1981's failure to reach
national origin claims has proven the least significant of these, as at least some
courts have applied a broad conception of race that includes both ethnicity and
national origin.'39
135. Id. at io-ii.
136. Id. at ii.
137. Id. at io.
138. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (Title VII).
139. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (holding that § 1981 protects
against discrimination on the basis of "ancestry or ethnic characteristics"); see also MacDissi
v. Vahnont Indus., 856 F.2d 1054, 1o6o (8th Cir. 1988) (applying § i98i to individuals of
Lebanese origin); Rigodon v. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc., No. 04-2548, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22385, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. ], 2004) (Haitian origin); Franchitti v. Bloomberg, No. 03-
7496, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21071, at *io (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2004) (French origin);
Aggarwal v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 98-5o63, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1367, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1o, 2000) (Indian origin). But see Pisharodi v. Valley Baptist Med.
Ctr., 393 F. Supp. 2d 561, 574 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (finding that national origin is not a basis for
a § 1981 claim).
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In contrast, the bar on § 1981 claims for sex discrimination has been
unforgiving. While § 1981's companion from the Reconstruction era, the
Fourteenth Amendment, has been interpreted to extend to sex discrimination,
the language of § 1981 is explicitly raced: all persons shall have the same rights
"as [are] enjoyed by white citizens."' 40 In Runyon v. McCrary, the Supreme
Court noted in dicta that the provision did not cover discrimination based on
sex; 14 1 other courts accepted this position as definitive.' 42 Given the statute's
language and the large body of precedent, courts mostly likely will not depart
from this interpretation. 43 The result for independent contractors cannot be
overstated.' 44 It is perfectly legal, under federal statutes such as Title VII, the
ADA, and the ADEA, to discriminate against an independent contractor simply
41146 147 148because she is a woman45 or because of her religion, 4 age, or disability.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
141. 427 U.S. 16o, 168 (1976).
142. See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. at 609; Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150
(2d Cir. 1987); Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 383 n.9 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting the lack of
intent to cover sex discrimination); DeFrank v. Pawlosky, 480 F. Supp. 115, 118 & n.9 (W.D.
Pa. 1979).
143. In the context of reverse discrimination, the Supreme Court stretched the literal language of
§ 1981. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (applying
§ 1981 to reverse discrimination and explaining that the phrase "as is enjoyed by white
citizens" is intended merely to "emphasiz[e] the racial character of the rights being
protected" (citations omitted)).
144. Female independent contractors may in some states be covered by state workplace
antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 951-963 (West 1991 & Supp. 2006).
145. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (loth Cir. 1987); Dardar v. Potter, No. 02-3802,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3512 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2004); Currie v. Brown & Joseph, Ltd., No.
02-6646, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12566 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2003); Alfred v. Tenn. Farmers
Mut. Ins. Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d lo24 (E.D. Tenn. 1997); Chapelle v. Beacon Commc'ns Corp.,
No. 92-8987, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15979 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1O, 1993); Barnes v. Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 978 (N.D. Tex. 1993). Some courts have gone to great
lengths to find that female plaintiffs on the border between employee and independent
contractor status are in fact "employees" in order to avoid this harsh result. See, e.g., Velez v.
Roche, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Excluding gender discrimination from
§ 1981's coverage also harms women who allege intersectional race and gender claims,
because their gender claims cannot be aggregated with their race claims. See generally
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139.
146. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 167; see also Elkhatib v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., No. 02-8131, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23066 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2004) (dismissing a religious discrimination
claim brought under § 1981 because the plaintiff was not an employee).
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In addition to confining the protected classes to which § 1981 extends,
courts have limited the types of discrimination to which it applies. In General
Building Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that § 1981
does not prohibit disparate impact discrimination, which occurs when a facially
neutral policy or practice has a disproportionate impact on a protected class;
rather, the statute forbids only disparate treatment, which requires evidence of
discriminatory motive.1 49 Because disparate impact theory allows plaintiffs to
prevail without having to produce proof that a party actually intended to
discriminate, closing off such relief has proven a "major blow[]" to § 1981's
utility. 5 ° In addition, § 1981 provides only a private right of action; unlike its
powers with regard to Title VII, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) may not receive, process, and vindicate claims under
§ 1981, ' a potential obstacle for individuals who cannot afford their own
attorneys."5 2 Finally, § 1981 plaintiffs cannot invoke the provision against state
employers."5 3
Combined, these limitations severely restrict the universe of plaintiffs with
viable § 1981 claims and the circumstances under which they can bring them.
Yet even those independent contractor plaintiffs whose claims arose under
theories and conditions suitable for § 1981 resolution have not obtained
widespread relief under the statute. There are several explanations for this
phenomenon. First, § 1981 is simply under-invoked. Because plaintiffs and
their attorneys are much more familiar with Title VII than with § 1981, many
147. See, e.g., Tyrrell v. City of Scranton, 134 F. Supp. 2d 373, 380, 387 (M.D. Pa. 2001)
(dismissing an age discrimination claim brought under the ADEA and § 1981 because the
defendant was not considered an "employer" and because § 1981 does not extend to age).
148. See, e.g., Anyan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Section 1981's
limited coverage disadvantages even women (and the disabled, and older workers, and so
on) who are traditional employees, because they are denied the procedural advantages of
combining their statutory claims with § 1981 claims.
149. 458 U.S. 375, 387-88 (1982).
15o. Joanna L. Grossman, Making a Federal Case out of It: Section 1981 and At-Will Employment, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 329, 335 (2001).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(a) (2000) (authorizing the EEOC to enforce violations of Title VII).
152. Lack of access to the EEOC also might be an obstacle for plaintiffs with monetary claims
that arc too small to be attractive to private attorneys. Michael Selmi, The Value of the
EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3
(1996).
153. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989) (finding that § 1983 provided
the "exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981
when the claim is pressed against a state actor").
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independent contractors sue only under Title VII.154 When those plaintiffs'
claims fail because courts find that they are independent contractors, they have
no § 1981 claims on which to fall back."' A recent Fifth Circuit decision,
however, may make it easier for independent contractor plaintiffs to add § 1981
claims after filing initial complaints containing only Title VII claims. ,
6
Some courts also seem not to understand that § 1981 may protect
independent contractors even when Title VII does not. In Wortham v. American
Family Insurance Co., Maria Wortham, an independent contractor insurance
agent, alleged race (as well as age and sex) discrimination by her company. s7
After stating that the same legal framework applied to analyze the plaintiffs
Title VII, § 1981, and other statutory claims, the district court concluded that
because Title VII does not reach independent contractors, the defendant was
entitled to "judgment as a matter of law on all of Wortham's claims. " s This
statement profoundly misunderstood § 1981, for the fact that the plaintiff was
an independent contractor would not entitle the defendant to summary
judgment on her § 1981 race discrimination claim. 9 Though infrequent, such
errors occur often enough to signify a problem. 
6
o
Despite § 1981's broad "make and enforce contracts" language and
expansive original goals, it currently offers functional coverage only to the very
limited subset of independent contractors who allege disparate treatment based
on race, and even those individuals rarely prevail. In practice, then, the number
154. See Selmi, supra note 152, at 45 (attributing "[t] he failure of private attorneys to develop
claims" under S 1981 in part to "a fair amount of either ignorance or laziness on the part of
attorneys, albeit laziness that is fostered by the existing institutional structure" and to their
comparative "familiarity with Title VII and its procedures").
155. See, e.g., Lockett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1384 (M.D. Ga. 2005) (dismissing
the Title VII claim of an independent contractor insurance agent who did not file a § 1981
claim).
156. Johnson v. Crown Enters., 398 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 2005) (permitting an independent
contractor plaintiff whose original complaint alleged only a Title VII claim to amend it to
include a § 1981 claim even though the statute of limitations had run, because the latter
claim related back to the former).
157. No. 6:01-02o67 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 22, 2003), affid on other grounds, 385 F.3d 1139, reh'g denied,
No. 03-3955, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24264 (8th Cir. Nov. 19, 2004).
158. Id., slip op. at 5 (emphasis added).
159. The appellate court in Wortham noted precisely this error. 385 F.3d at 1141.
160. See, e.g., Holtzman v. World Book Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 251, 258 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (summarily
dismissing a § 1981 claim after finding that "no reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff
was an employee as defined by Title VII" and that § 1981 claims are "analyzed under the
same framework as Title VII" claims); Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Group, No. 94-2838,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10104 (E.D. La. July 16, 1996) (similar); Roscoe v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., No. 88-0882, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17468 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 1988) (similar).
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of independent contractors obtaining meaningful judicial scrutiny of their
claims through § 1981 is small.
B. Section 1981's Doctrinal Limitations
Section 1981's problems extend beyond the constraints on those who may
and do bring claims under it. Even independent contractors who bring § 1981
claims are frequently denied a fair shot at relief because the Title VII doctrine
with which courts have applied § 1981-borrowed wholesale from the
employment context-is not closely tailored to the work experiences of
independent contractors. While Title VII-style coverage is far better than no
coverage, the case law shows that it may not be the best independent
contractors can get.
The ties between Title VII and § 1981 are close and important. Title VII
immediately preceded and likely spurred § 1981's judicial rebirth, 6 1 and it has
since served as a model for its rejuvenated form. 62 Given this relationship, it is
unsurprising that courts have analyzed § 1981 claims virtually in lockstep with
Title VII claims. Specifically, courts evaluate circumstantial evidence of
discrimination under § 1981 using the three-step burden-shifting framework
set forth in McDonnell Douglas. First, the plaintiff must make out a prima facie
case of discrimination; '63 second, the defendant must articulate a "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for its action;, 6' and, finally, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant's stated reason "was in fact pretext. '' 6, If the plaintiff
16l. George Rutherglen argues that modern civil rights legislation made the extension of § 1981
to private discrimination less drastic, as the modern legislation already reached most private
conduct-primarily in the fair housing and employment contexts. Rutherglen, supra note
79, at 332; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 16o, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(remarking that recent congressional policy evidenced an intent to "eliminat[e] racial
segregation in all sectors of society"). The 196os statutes also provided political support for
the Court's decisions because they endorsed broad federal power over civil rights even at the
expense of states' rights. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 334-36.
162. See Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 336 (stating that the decisions, "by abandoning the
Fourteenth Amendment as the model for interpreting sections 1981 and 1982,... necessarily
adopted the modern civil rights laws as a substitute").
163. This step has four elements: the plaintiff must show that (1) he was a member of a protected
class; (2) he was qualified for the position in question; (3) he was nonetheless denied the
position (or fired); and (4) a similarly situated person outside his class was granted the
position (or was maintained) instead. See Tex. Dep't of Cmry. Affairs v. Burdine, 45o U.S.
248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
164. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
165. Id. at 804.
197
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
does so by a preponderance of the evidence, a fact-finder may infer intentional
discrimination in violation of Title VII.i
66
When Patterson first applied the McDonnell Douglas scheme to § 1981 claims
alleging employment discrimination, the Court reasoned only that the
provisions were "analogous" and the system was a "sensible, orderly way to
evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination. "167 Though this step was perfectly reasonable at the
time, the analogy begins to break down today in the independent contracting
context-one that the Justices could not then have foreseen. Nonetheless, rigid
adherence to precedent has left courts loath to reconsider § 1981 doctrine, and
judges now apply it in all circumstances as a "special" Title VII with some
vestigial procedural quirks. Because Title VII doctrine does not map precisely
onto contracting relationships, this treatment has posed particular challenges
to independent contractors seeking to prove discrimination by way of the
McDonnell Douglas framework.
The first point in the inquiry at which independent contractors are more
likely to stumble than employees is at the prima facie stage. Though ordinarily
the burden of making out a prima facie case should not be onerous," '6 some
courts have applied the test in such a way as to cause independent contractors
substantial difficulty. One element of the showing requires a plaintiff to
identify similarly situated individuals outside her protected group who
obtained the precise positions for which she applied and was rejected. 69
Independent contractors and other contract-based contingent workers,
however, often neither apply to formal positions nor go through formal
application procedures, and the decisions about their hiring, firing, and tasks
166. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 509, 511 (1993). After the Supreme Court's
decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), plaintiffs also may prevail if they
can demonstrate that discrimination was one motive for the employment action, even if the
employer had other, nondiscriminatory motives. Id. at lOl. Prior to Desert Palace, plaintiffs
had to produce direct evidence to get a mixed-motive jury instruction. Demonstrating
"mixed motives" limits the plaintiff's remedies, however. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(g)(2)(B)
(2000).
167. 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (citation omitted).
168. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506 (describing the
"minimal requirements of such a prima facie case").
169. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. The "similarly situated" standard also would apply to
other employment actions, such as if the plaintiffwere demoted and others outside her class
were not. Note that courts differ in the precise formulation of this standard, but the
underlying concept of finding a comparator outside the class remains constant.
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tend to be more subjective and decentralized.'70 As a result, plaintiffs have a
harder time finding-and courts have a harder time accepting-"similarly
situated" comparators. For example, in one case, a company refused to renew
its contract with a black independent contractor who sold security alarm
systems.17 ' The independent contractor was the only black dealer, and he
alleged that a sales manager had called him a "nigger" and that another had
admonished him only to hire white telemnarketers.' 72 Nonetheless, the court
found that he had not made out a prima facie case because he could not provide
evidence that he was "treated any differently than similarly situated white
dealers.' 1 73 In other cases, courts have dismissed the claims of independent
contractor truck drivers because their proposed comparators were not
sufficiently similar: for example, because the comparator was both a truck
owner and a dispatcher, 174 or because the comparator drove his own truck while
the plaintiff did not. 75 But such variation in particulars is standard for
independent contractor relationships. In other words, these plaintiffs faced
particular difficulty making a prima facie showing because of the nature of
independent contractor relationships.
Most challenging for independent contractors, however, has been the
pretext phase. Though traditional employees tend to have trouble with this
stage as well,' 76  the problems that independent contractors face are
exacerbated. Because the independent contractor relationship is, by design,
more precarious than employment, it is harder to prove that a firm's decision
170. Cf. STONE, supra note 1, at 165, 171-72 (explaining how, in the new workplace, decisions are
ad hoc, decentralized, and unsystematic).
171. Fair v. Prime Sec. Distribs., No. 94 -CV-70324-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11230 (E.D. Mich.
June 7, 1996).
172. Id. at *16-17.
173. Id. at *15, *18.
174. Green v. Rediehs Transit Line, No. 00-2422, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27977, at *4 (7th Cir.
Nov. 1, 2000); see also id. at "1-2 (finding that the dispatcher gave his own trucks better
assignments than he gave the plaintiff and used the phrase "black nigger").
175. Taylor v. ADS, Inc., 327 F. 3 d 579, 581 (7 th Cir. 2003). For another case in which the claim of
an independent contractor truck driver was dismissed for failing to show that other drivers
were "similarly situated," see Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168 (7 th Cir.
1996).
176. See Guerrero v. Ashcroft, 253 F. 3 d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Creating a triable pretext issue
with indirect evidence is a difficult task ...."); see also STONE, supra note i, at 157 (noting
that intentional discrimination is becoming harder to prove even for traditional employees
because "[t]he diffused and decentralized authority structure of the new boundaryless
workplace can give rise to bias and favoritism that is more subtle than discrimination in
internal labor markets").
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to terminate the contract or not to renew it (among other actions) was
discriminatory. Some employers hire independent contractors precisely
because they want the ability to shrink their workforces later, with a minimum
of hassle or delay.177 In other words, it is easy and credible for an employer to
provide an unsophisticated economic and nondiscriminatory reason to
terminate (or fail to initiate) an independent contractor relationship. Under
any circumstances, courts are reluctant to scrutinize business-related
decisions, 78 but this hesitancy is particularly strong in independent contractor
cases.
In Crabtree v. DMJM-Phillips Reister Haley, Inc., for example, the African-
American plaintiff contracted with a construction company to install
guardrails." 9 While the company routinely waived bonding requirements for
other subcontractors, it did not do so for the plaintiff and terminated his
contract when he could not make bond. The court found that the defendant
defeated a showing of pretext because it "present[ed] business justifications for
the situations in which it did waive bond.'" o Similarly, in Hairston v. AT&T
Co., the plaintiff, whose bid to perform an outsourced element of AT&T's
switching business was rejected, endeavored to show pretext by questioning
the company's economic rationale.1' The court stated that the plaintiffs
"evidence on the issues of finances and operations amounts to no more than a
challenge to AT&T's business decisions. ' ,, 82 While independent contractor
plaintiffs may challenge defendants' business-related explanations, they will
find it difficult to persuade a court that these explanations are illegitimate.
Only a small number of independent contractors have taken § 1981 claims
far enough to get judicial scrutiny under McDonnell Douglas.83 As the cases
described above reveal, Title VII doctrine presents unique challenges to
17. See discussion supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
178. See Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Commc'ns, 738 F.2d 118l, 1187 (iith Cir. 1984) (holding that
an employer may take an action "for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on
erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory
reason").
179. No. 91-1160, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 25203 (loth Cir. Sept. 30, 1992).
18o. Id. at *6.
181. No. 94 C 1213, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12637 (N.D. 111. Aug. 28, 1995).
182. Id. at *16; see also Wortham v. Am. Family Ins. Co., No. Col-2o67, slip. op. at 8 (N.D. Iowa
Oct. 22, 2003) (holding that the plaintiff failed to prove pretext in the defendant's argument
that the plaintiff's insurance agency was not "profitable"), affd on other grounds, 385 F.3d
1139, reh'g denied, No. 03-3955, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 24264 (8th Cir. Nov. 19, 2004).
183. See supra note 82. Little information exists about the frequency of these cases, so this
conclusion is based on my research.
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independent contractors, and its mechanical application may bar relief. Yet
when independent contractors' § 1981 claims do survive summary judgment,
they occasionally have reached satisfactory outcomes. Some plaintiffs have
received substantial jury awards,'8 and others have settled out of court.' Ss This
pattern implies that if the doctrine is applied more forgivingly, fact-finders can
find independent contractors' discrimination claims compelling.
Though § 1981 suffers from both structural and doctrinal limitations, it
also holds the promise of meaningful coverage for today's independent
contractors. To fulfill this promise, however, the provision must be updated
for the modern workplace.
IV. RETHEORIZING § 1981
Section 1981 stands at a critical crossroads in its "improbable history."'86
Passed with the ambitious and noble goal of granting freed slaves full and
equal citizenship, it was inextricably linked to, and immediately overshadowed
by, its constitutional counterpart, the Fourteenth Amendment. After a long
period of neglect, courts yoked § 1981 to the next great round of visionary civil
rights legislation passed in the 196os. '8 Meanwhile, far from the courtroom,
the American workforce was changing, as firms moved away from the internal
labor markets of the past and toward a contingent workforce composed in part
of independent contractors. Section 1981 today unites these phenomena, but it
still has far to go. Updating the provision will require Congress and the courts
both to draw on Title VII and to separate it from § 1981. Ultimately, § 1981 can
provide critical and integrated antidiscrimination protection for the new
workforce.
184. See Bains, LLC v. ARCO Prods. Co., 405 F. 3d 764 (9 th Cir. 2005); Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 178 F. 3 d 8 (lst Cir. 1999); Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F.2d 291 (iith
Cir. 1988).
185. See, e.g., Turner v. Mony Life Ins. Co., No. 04 C 3065, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21174 (N.D.
1I. 2004); Minute Entry, Turner, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21174 (filed Apr. 25, 2oo5); Carey v.
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 9o2 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (defeating the
defendant's motion for summary judgment); Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Carey, 321 F.
Supp. 2d 902 (No. C-2-o2-1o 5 2); Pritchett-Evans v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 4 :ol-CV-97,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2870 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2003); Stipulation and Order, Pritchett-
Evans, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2870 (filed July 9, 2003).
186. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 303.
187. See supra Section II.A.
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A. Why Protect Independent Contractors?
As an initial matter, reforming § 1981 will require convincing courts and
legislatures that the independent contractors now excluded from Title VII are a
population deserving of antidiscrimination protection and cannot, as some
claim, fend for themselves. Though a number of scholars have warned against
the wholesale inclusion of independent contractors within the totality of federal
labor and employment law,18 8 however, no one has made a cogent argument
for excluding them from antidiscrimination law in particular.18 9 In other
contexts, the case for leaving independent contractors outside regulatory
schemes rests on three premises. The first is that independent contractors,
unlike employees, have equal bargaining power with those who hire them, and
thus do not require government intervention. 9 ° The second is that, because
the independent contractor market is fluid and can respond quickly to
changing conditions, labor market forces gradually will purge economically
irrational discrimination even without regulation.'91 And the third is that
giving independent contractors a cause of action for discrimination would
increase unnecessarily the already rising number of employment discrimination
lawsuits.
These arguments do not hold water in today's labor market. First, like
employees, most independent contractors have only fictitious bargaining
188. See Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12 LAB. LAW.
117, 131 (1996); Hylton, supra note 72, at 85o; Perritt, supra note 48, at 1039; Schwab, supra
note 34, at 916.
i89. Some have recommended more piecemeal expansion of coverage to independent
contractors. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 57, at 85 (suggesting that independent contractors
with employees of their own might not require protection); Maltby & Yamada, supra note
13, at 268 (describing "fixed ceiling" and "factor tests" approaches that would exempt from
protection independent contractors with a fixed number of employees or with more
employees than the defendant, respectively).
19o. See Silverstein & Goselin, supra note 37, at 23 ("[T]he law assumes that there is a defining
difference between . . . 'employees,' who lack control over their work and their destinies,
and 'non-employees,' (including] independent contractors, . .. who choose the risks and
rewards of individual endeavor through self-employment, professional or educational
distinction, or non-exclusive work arrangements."); see also Befort, supra note 13, at 171;
Carlson, supra note 5, at 356 ("[L]awmakers may assume that.., there is no valid argument
for interfering with bargaining between independent businesses ... ").
191. For the quintessential exposition of this argument in the employment context, see RicHARD
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1992).
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power and are highly economically dependent on the firms that hire them.'9 2
Equal bargaining power or not, the rationale for permitting discrimination
against independent contractors is nonetheless elusive: as one author asked,
why should antidiscrimination law "prohibit a plumbing contractor from
refusing to hire a plumber merely because he or she is black, female, disabled,
or old, while permitting a textile manufacturer to refuse services from a solo
plumbing contractor on the basis of the same prejudices?"' 93 Second, market
forces are as unlikely to drive out discrimination in the independent
contracting market as they have been in the employment market, where
evidence from the past forty years suggests that eradicating discrimination
requires government intervention. '94 Third, the argument that extending
coverage to independent contractors will increase litigation is possibly untrue
and certainly a red herring."' Employment discrimination litigation is rising
steadily across the board;' 96 to stem that tide would require broad structural
changes. Decreasing litigation by excluding an entire class of workers-some
192. See Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 273-74 (ioth Cir. 1987) ("[I]nequality of bargaining
power, the dominant ability to perpetuate or terminate a business relationship and
otherwise to dictate terms, probably characterizes most dealings between large corporations
and independent contractors."); cf. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944)
("Inequality of bargaining power ... may as well characterize the status of [independent
contractors] as of [employees]. The former, when acting alone, may be as helpless in
dealing with an employer, as dependent .. .on his daily wage and as unable to leave the
employ and to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment as the latter." (internal citations
omitted)). Employees and independent contractors frequently have near-identical work
experiences. See Befort, supra note 13, at 171; Carlson, supra note 5, at 298, 300.
193. Linder, supra note 65, at 223.
194. The argument of Title VII's opponents that an unimpeded labor market will tend to correct
for employment discrimination on its own has been largely discredited. See John J. Donohue
III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REv.
1583, 1592-96 (1992) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 191) (providing a summary of empirical
research disproving the claim that federal legislative intervention was largely irrelevant to
improving the status of black workers); see also John J. Donohue III, Is Title VI1 Efficient?,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1431 (1986) (casting Title VII as "wealth-maximizing legislation," or,
in other words, as "a tool to perfect the market response to employer discrimination").
There is no reason why the argument should apply with any greater force in the
independent contracting context. See Befort, supra note 13, at 174 ("[I]t will not unduly
distort labor market competition by extending the anti-discrimination ban to [independent
contractors]."); Perritt, supra note 48, at 1039 (stating that antidiscrimination statutes "have
no particular concern with labor market competitive forces").
195. Some commentators in fact have argued that extending coverage would reduce litigation by
eliminating uncertainty about the status of workers who currently fall in the "zone of
ambiguity." Carlson, supra note 5, at 365; see also id. at 301 (discussing "wasteful litigation of
the employee status issue"); Maltby & Yamada, supra note 13, at 266.
196. See supra note 68.
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with nonfrivolous claims of discrimination -forces independent contractors to
pay the price for systemic flaws.
In a fundamental way, these arguments miss the point of
antidiscrimination law. Title VII and its companion statutes exist to safeguard
the human dignity of workers, 197 a symbolic goal with overwhelming public
support."9s Because arbitrary discrimination harms the personal development
and integrity of an independent contractor as much as an employee, the same
rationale that justifies regulating the employment market also justifies
regulating independent contractual relationships.
B. Why Section 1981?
There is a growing consensus among scholars, policymakers, and workers
that independent contractors must receive the benefits of modern employment
discrimination law. Even assuming clear support for extending
antidiscrimination protection, however, there would be a number of means by
which to do so. This Note argues that updating 5 1981 is the most theoretically,
doctrinally, and practically appropriate solution to the condition of
independent contractors, but it recognizes that other options also might go a
long way toward providing meaningfiuil relief.
For example, some scholars have urged a return, either judicially or
legislatively, to the economic realities test for employment that Darden
repudiated.'9 9 While this step would extend antidiscrimination coverage to
more independent contractors than does the common law agency test, it still
would exclude a large portion of the independent contractor workforce -
without any finding that those excluded are less deserving of protection against
discrimination. Another option would be to leave the federal statutes as they
are and to rely on state statutory and common law to fill the gaps in coverage.
197. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Responses to Epstein, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 320, 320 (1990)
("[C]ivil rights laws [are] precisely what they are called, 'rights' laws."); Marion Crain,
Rationalizing Inequality: An Antifeminist Defense of the "Free" Market, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
556 (1993) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note 191); Nancy Dowd, Liberty vs. Equality in Defense
of Privileged White Males, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 429 (1993) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra note
191).
198. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the public consensus behind the
antidiscrimination principle). Even Richard Epstein recognizes that "a broad
antidiscrimination principle lies at the core of American political and intellectual
understandings of a just and proper society" and that it enjoys "unchallenged social
acceptance." EPSTEIN, supra note 191, at 1, 3; see also id. at 499.
199. See, e.g., Carnevale et al., supra note 4, at 293; Dowd, supra note 57, at 77. For a discussion of
the economic realities test, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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At least a few states have antidiscrimination statutes that cover independent
contractors, 20 0 and, as some commentators have suggested, many states have
existing common law remedies that could be used to target discrimination in
contractual relationships.2 1 ' This idea is an intriguing one for the future, but
these doctrines are not sufficiently developed today to provide widespread and
meaningful relief. ° 2 Moreover, common law varies from state to state and so
cannot provide nationwide protection along the Title VII model.2 0 ' At best,
contract and tort remedies might supplement, not substitute for, the federal
statutory protection that protected classes of employees enjoy.
20 4
Yet another avenue of reform would involve legislatively amending Title
VII, the ADA, and the ADEA to include independent contractors, either by
altering the definitions of "employee" to include independent contractors"°5 or
by adding independent contractors as an additional covered category separate
from employees . 6 Those changes would close the existing coverage gap
considerably. Leaving Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA as they are, however,
and instead amending § 1981 to extend it to the other nonracial classes
protected by those statutes would provide a number of advantages-both
concrete and symbolic - that this course of action would not.
The first major advantage of extending § 1981 is a theoretical one, as the
provision is uniquely suited to the plight of the modern-day independent
contractor. Ironically, the statute's 15o-year-old origins-potentially seen as
rendering the statute anachronistic because of the immense changes in
American society-give it theoretical vitality today. First, in a remarkable
2oo. See supra note 144.
201. See Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model
for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. R-v.
183 (1994); Jason E. Pirruccello, Note, Contingent Worker Protection from Client Company
Discrimination: Statutory Coverage, Gaps, and the Role of the Common Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 191
(2005).
202. See Williams, supra note 201, at 218 (describing the common law's limitations); Pirruccello,
supra note 201, at 208, 219 (same).
203. Cf Pirruccello, supra note 201, at 219 (describing Texas's refusal to recognize the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing).
204. The common law also may shape how federal law is applied to independent contractors. See
infra notes 236-253 and accompanying text.
205. See Carnevale et al., supra note 4, at 293 (proposing the legislative extension of Title VII, the
ADA, and the ADEA to independent contractors); Perritt, supra note 48, at 1039 (proposing
a similar extension but only to independent contractors without their own employees); see
also Linder, supra note 65, at 223 (proposing that employee status be eliminated as a coverage
requirement altogether).
2o6. See Maltby & Yamada, supra note 13, at 266.
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example of history coming full circle, some aspects of the workplace of 20o6
resemble the workplace of 1866 more closely than they do the workplace of
1964. Just as the freed black slaves of the Reconstruction era went individually
from landowner to landowner, contracting to peddle their labor, today's
independent contractors move from employer to employer, using the business
contract to market their skills. Though the barriers to productive employment
for blacks in the 186os were more severe than those they and other
subordinated groups face today, both cohorts have seen arbitrary
discrimination frustrate the free functioning of the labor market. And both,
therefore, require the same guarantee of a fair work experience.2"7
Second, the visionary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 remains
profoundly timely: the right to contract is today as fundamental an element of
freedom and citizenship as it was then. 8 In some ways, the tendency of
modern doctrine (including antidiscrimination law) to sanctify the
employment relationship-after all, just one subset of contracts- has distracted
from this core concept. As scholars and modern legislators have noted,
productive work is critical to full participation in society and "unquestionably
resounds with our constitutional values of liberty, equal citizenship, and
national union."0 9 But as the framers of the 1866 Act recognized, it is not just
the practical ramifications of a contract (in other words, the exchange of labor
for money) that confer human dignity; it also is the very right to enter into a
contract, and have society honor that contract equally with others, that does
so."' To the extent that modern antidiscrimination law fails to understand that
the contract, not just "employment" in the usual sense, is "constitutive of
citizenship, community, and even personal identity,""' § 1981-updated to
preserve its practical relevance - is a perfect avenue by which to reintroduce the
concept.
In addition to its theoretical elegance, protecting independent contractors
via § 1981 also offers doctrinal advantages over Title VII. Existing cases
demonstrate that many independent contractor claims evaluated under the
207. See generally supra Section II.A.
2o8. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (describing Senator Trumbull's invocation of
founding principles).
2og. Karst, supra note 21, at 557; see also ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORATION 3 (1977) ("[Tlhe job makes the person."); Karst, supra note 21, at 529
(" [W] ork has been one major arena in which America's basic constitutional values of liberty,
equality, and national union have been either validated or frustrated.").
21o. See discussion supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
211. Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, loo COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1886 (2000).
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McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework have not fared well. 2 ' In
particular, a rigid application of the prima facie and pretext phases of the
scheme has worked to disadvantage independent contractors as a group." 3
While current Title VII doctrine seems unable to bridge the divide between
employment and independent contracting, § 1981 is more of a doctrinal blank
slate. As it seems that courts have analyzed the provision under McDonnell
Douglas primarily out of convenience, 14 § 1981 is susceptible to doctrinal
innovation both in how McDonnell Douglas is applied and in the potential
influence of common law principles." '
Perhaps most importantly, 5 1981 is available right now, at least for some
independent contractors, and therefore has a great deal of practical value.
Legislative amendments frequently take time and effort to enact, even with a
broad consensus and active sponsors. While broader legislative projects move
toward fruition, attorneys can begin urging clients alleging race-based
disparate treatment discrimination to file the § 1981 claims already available to
them. Simultaneously, courts can familiarize themselves with discrimination
claims by independent contractors and experiment with alternative doctrinal
approaches that are fairer to those plaintiffs.
Updating § 1981 would reconnect modern civil rights law to the
fundamental guarantees of the Reconstruction legislation at a time when
millions of Americans sorely need it. But because § 1981 currently is both
structurally flawed and underdeveloped, implementing this new vision will
require legislative and judicial effort. If successful, this effort will produce a
1981 modernized in form and resuscitated in spirit.
C. Implementing the New § 1981
Section 1981 stands poised to help independent contractors to face a host of
discriminatory barriers, not just race-based ones. There is no reason to believe
that women, the elderly, the disabled, and members of minority religions- all
groups Congress has protected in the workplace because of their history of
subordination-are any less likely to experience discrimination in independent
212. See supra Section II1.B (describing how independent contractors stumble when courts apply
the McDonnell Douglas framework).
213. See supra Section III.B.
214. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
215. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see ibfra notes 239-253 and accompanying text.
See also Steven J. Burton, Racial Discrimination in Contract Performance: Patterson and a State
LavAlternative, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 431, 434 (1990).
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contractor relationships than they are in employment relationships. Thus, the
principal legislative change must be to expand § 1981's coverage to these
216groups.
Section 1981 has both constitutional and statutory models for this revision.
Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment, like the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
to end racial discord in the post-Civil War era. Despite that original race-
focused purpose, courts have updated the Fourteenth Amendment since its
ratification to cover classifications other than race (most notably sex) .217 While
courts are unlikely to expand the categories covered by § 1981,218 the
provision's identity as the "statutory penumbra"219 of the Fourteenth
Amendment suggests that Congress might update § 1981 in similar ways. In
recent decades, Congress has extended national protection legislatively to the
elderly and the disabled, a forceful demonstration of the modern consensus
behind the antidiscrimination principle.2" And in 1991, when Congress
expanded some of Title VII's remedies to resemble more closely those available
under 5 1981 (namely, adding some compensatory and punitive remedies),22 ' it
did so in part to eliminate disparities between victims of race discrimination,
who could claim such remedies under § 1981, and victims of other kinds of
discrimination, who could not." In taking this practical step, Congress
reaffirmed its continuing commitment to the symbolic import of § 1981, as it
has done in the past.223
216. See infra note 224 for a discussion of a possible legislative framework.
217. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
218. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text. But cf. Jay I. Sabin, Clio and the Court Redux:
Toward a Dynamic Mode of Interpreting Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Laws, 23 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 369 (1990) (suggesting dynamic statutory interpretation of § 1981 on the pre-
versus post-formation question).
219. Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 351.
22o. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §5 621-634 (2000); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (2000).
221. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A, 1O5 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b) (2000)).
222. See S. COMM. ON LABOR & HuMAN RES., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, S. REP. No. 101-315,
at 7 (1990).
223. At least twice, Congress has considered and rejected the possibility of subsuming § 1981 into
modern civil rights legislation. When Congress enacted the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972,
the Senate entertained an amendment to make the Equal Pay Act and Title VII the exclusive
federal remedies for employment discrimination. In response to the amendment, a Senator
stated: "The law against employment discrimination did not begin with [T]itle VII and the
EEOC, nor is it intended to end with it.... [This amendment would] repeal the first major
piece of civil rights legislation in this Nation's history. We cannot do that." 118 CONG. REC.
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These factors suggest that Congress might be amenable to expanding
1981 to cover other categories of discrimination. In 1994, Senator Howard
Metzenbaurn introduced legislation that essentially would have accomplished
this.2" Though the bill failed, a similar effort today might fare substantially
better. For one thing, Senator Metzenbaum's bill expanded not just
antidiscrirmination protections to contingent workers but also minimum wage,
collective bargaining, and occupational safety and health guarantees-all more
controversial than antidiscrimination alone."' More importantly, the public
landscape has changed dramatically since 1994. The number of independent
contractors has soared, so it is likely that members of Congress have growing
numbers of contingent workers among their constituents. A poll in 2000 found
that more than three in five of those surveyed either had been in contingent
positions themselves or knew someone who had in the past ten years. More
than two-thirds found it unfair for companies to treat contingent workers
worse than regular employees, and 6o% would vote for a congressional
candidate who promised to secure equal treatment of contingent workers. 6
The time is ripe for legislative action.
Congress also should amend § 1981 to reach discrimination beyond mere
disparate treatment. As under Title VII, § 1981 plaintiffs should be able to file
disparate impact lawsuits-a critical tool in light of increasing difficulties in
proving intentional discrimination." 7 Additionally, Congress should take steps
to bring § 1981 in line with Title VII procedurally: it should authorize the
S. 3371 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). The second time was when
Congress debated the Civil Rights Act of 1991. S. REP. No. 101-315, at 12 (calling § 1981 "a
critically important tool used to strike down racially discriminatory practices in a broad
variety of contexts").
224. See Contingent Workforce Equity Act, S. 2504, 1o3 d Cong. (1994). The bill would have
amended § 1981 to protect the right to contract free from "discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability"; for substantive legal content, the bill
referred to Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA. Id. §§ 102-103, 302-303. This bill built upon
an earlier proposal by Senator Patricia Schroeder, first introduced in 1987, to extend health
and pension benefits to contingent workers. See Part-Time and Temporary Workers
Protection Act of 1987, S. 1309, iooth Cong. (1987).
225. S. 2504, §§ 101, 104-105; see also supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (describing
scholars' views that antidiscrimination protection is less controversial than other types of
labor protections).
226. N. Am. Alliance for Fair Employment, Contingent Workers Fight for Fairness,
http://www.fairjobs.org/fairjobs/contingent/cwffe-poll.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2006).
227. See discussion supra note 15o and accompanying text. The Supreme Court could undo its
own decision not to extend § 1981 to disparate impact suits, but in light of the longstanding
precedent and Congress's explicit choice not to override that decision in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, see Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 346, such an act seems unlikely.
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EEOC to enforce § 1981, permit suits to go forward against state employers,
and regularize the applicable statutes of limitations across the country and for
all types of§ 1981 claims.228
Though § 1981 should be made consistent with Title VII from a procedural
perspective, the courts (and Congress, if necessary to break with precedent)
also should revamp the § 1981 doctrine to better protect those who seek to
contract. Doing so likely will not require entirely dismantling the McDonnell
Douglas scheme, which, as the Patterson Court acknowledged, is a "sensible"
means of dealing with the circumstantial evidence that tends to prove subtle
discrimination.22 9 Yet the mechanistic application of McDonnell Douglas, which
the Supreme Court itself has decried, 30 has frustrated the objectives of the
provision in whose service it has been deployed.
As they develop doctrine for applying the new § 1981 to independent
contractors, courts will have to alter Title VII doctrine in at least some respects.
Given that the rigid application of the prima facie and pretext requirements
tends to stymie independent contractor cases, a moderate option would be to
encourage a more flexible McDonnell Douglas analysis. For example, instead of
hewing so closely to the prima facie requirements when an independent
contractor cannot find another independent contractor "similarly situated"
enough to act as a comparator for her prima facie case, the court could accept a
less similarly situated comparator or, if the plaintiff's evidence were strong,
dispense with that requirement altogether. In Williams v. Travelers Indemnity
Co., for example, the court found that the plaintiff, an independent contractor,
had made out a prima facie case even though he could not show "that his
treatment differed in any way from other agents similarly situated.""23 The
court went on to find that the defendant's proffered legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason was unpersuasive and that the plaintiffs evidence of
discrimination was sufficient to survive summary judgment.232 Courts could
z28. Congress also could consider legislatively overruling Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 126 S.
Ct. 1246 (20o6), a recent Supreme Court case holding that only individuals with rights
under existing or proposed contracts have causes of action under § 1981. Permitting
nonparties with distinct injuries also to bring suit would expand the universe of individuals
with standing under § 1981, though it is not clear the extent to which Domino's Pizza
currently lets "discriminatory acts.., go unpunished." Id. at 1251.
229. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
230. Furuco, 438 U.S. at 577 (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework "was never intended
to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic"); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502, 519 (1993) (citing Furnco).
231. No. 87 C 6098, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9049, at *14 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1989).
232. Id. at *16.
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reach a similar result by replacing the burden-shifting scheme with a "basic"
approach whereby the fact-finder simply evaluates the plaintiffs proof, direct
or otherwise; evaluates the defendant's proof that it did not discriminate; and
evaluates the evidence as a whole.
2 33
To address the challenges independent contractors face in the pretext
phase, courts should look more skeptically at defendants' purported business
reasons for failing to contract with plaintiffs, terminating their contracts, or
otherwise mistreating them. Those who hire independent contractors can claim
easily that they terminated a contract with an individual simply because they
could and they wanted to-a primary reason employers hire independent
contractors in the first place. Yet courts must look behind the face of such
explanations. One technique would be to apply in the § 1981 context an
expansive reading of Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, which held that Title VII
plaintiffs could survive summary judgment by providing sufficient proof of
"mixed motives" (in other words, that discrimination was a motivating factor,
if not the only one).234 For independent contractors, a broad conception of the
mixed-motive framework would mean a significantly lighter burden in the
pretext phase because they could show merely that discrimination was one
reason that existed alongside the defendant's proffered business justification,
rather than the only reason.23
In light of § 1981's language and history, which have ties to the common
law, courts may wish to draw not only from discrimination doctrine but also
233. See, e.g., Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified
Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 673 (1998). As
Chin and Golinsky note, McDonnell Douglas has been criticized widely even in the context of
classic employment discrimination litigation. Id. at 659-6o.
234. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). The case has left Title VII courts and commentators confused over the
scope of its holding. See Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About
Nothing- Wy Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell Douglas Nor Transformed All
Employment Cases into Mixed-Motive, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395 (2005); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le
Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the
Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives"
Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71,79 (2003).
235. In the Title VII context, proving "mixed motives" limits the plaintiffs' remedies to
declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees and costs, as the Civil Rights Act of 1991
requires. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(g)(2)(B) (2000). Courts that borrow the mixed-motive
framework in applying § 1981, however, need not adopt the remedies limitations, as they
would not be bound by the statutory language. They should be especially wary of doing so if
a large portion of independent contractor cases were to become mixed-motive cases,
depriving independent contractor plaintiffs of the full damages to which they are entitled.
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from the common law of contracts, torts, and corporations.236 Scholars have
urged courts to look to the common law as an accepted and valuable source of
norms and rules for updating statutes at risk of becoming obsolete.237 Section
1981 is particularly open to the influence of the common law because the
provision, not establishing any substantive contractual rights on its own, by
necessity refers to extrinsic contract law.3 8 In determining whether a defendant
has violated § 1981, either in the pretext phase of McDonnell Douglas or
independent of it, courts should consult principles and standards borrowed
from the common law and, if they find the conduct in question actionable,
interpret § 1981 to forbid it.
Several commentators have suggested that contract remedies could provide
a rich source of protections against discrimination in contractual relationships,
independent of federal statutory causes of action.2 39 Neil Williams has argued,
for example, that the duty-to-serve doctrine, which requires public service
companies to serve all members of the public without distinction,240 could
support an implied contractual promise not to discriminate in "those instances
in which members of a community can reasonably expect to be free from
discrimination."' 4 ' Another avenue of contractual relief involves the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, which a party breaches by engaging in "bad
faith" conduct that "violate[s] community standards of decency, fairness or
reasonableness. '"42 While plaintiffs and their attorneys should of course work
to develop these independent causes of action, they also could supply standards
for courts to apply through the prism of § 1981. If a § 1981 defendant's conduct
would be illegitimate under the common law of contracts, that suggests that
236. Looking to the common law to influence § 1981 doctrine is different from relying on
common law remedies themselves to alleviate discrimination, which would be problematic.
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
z37. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982); see also Burton,
supra note 215, at 434 (suggesting that "the formalistic chasm between statutory and
common law" should be bridged).
238. Burton, supra note 215, at 446.
239. See id. at 446-47; Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Towards an Expansive Equality
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1025 (2003);
Williams, supra note 2O1; Pirruccello, supra note 201.
240. Williams, supra note 201, at 202-03.
241. Id. at 208.
242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981); see also Houh, supra note 239,
at lO88; Williams, supra note 201, at 214; Pirruccello, supra note 2o, at 218-20. Steven
Burton has developed an analogous contract law argument that relies on the lawful
performance doctrine, which implies into the terms of a contract the statutory framework
existing at formation. Burton, supra note 215, at 473-74.
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the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of his statutorily guaranteed right to
make and enforce contracts without discriminatory barriers.
Because § 1981 sounds in tort as well," courts also should consult that
body of common law for remedies for discrimination in contractual
relationships. Under the common law of tort, an independent contractor who
has faced discrimination at the hands of someone other than the person who
hired him, such as an employee of that person, might have a claim for tortious
interference with his contract with the principal.' The standard for evaluating
such claims is whether the interferer's conduct was "improper[],""4 which has
been read to mean "malicious,,6 -certainly a concept expansive enough to
include discrimination. For harassment in the context of a contractual
relationship, a discrimination victim also may have an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 47 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one
is liable if his "extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another."" 8 Like the standards for contract
law violations, these analyses could inform the application of § 1981.
Finally, the business judgment rule from the corporations context could
provide content to the evaluation of § 1981 discrimination claims. When
shareholders sue corporate officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty,
the business judgment rule shields the defendants from judicial scrutiny of the
soundness of their business decisions, as long as the defendants act in good
faith and with the honest belief that their actions are in the best interest of the
company. ' 9 In practice, the rule serves as an evidentiary presumption, and in
that sense resembles the burden-shifting in stages two and three of the
McDonnell Douglas analysis. Under the rule, however, even decisions for which
directors can offer a sound, persuasive business rationale are not insulated if
the plaintiff shows that they conceal an improper motive.2"' At least one scholar
has argued that decisions based on racial discrimination or stereotyping fit this
243. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661 (1987) (suggesting that § 1981 sounds
in tort because racial discrimination is a "fundamental injury to the individual rights of a
person").
244. Pirruccello, supra note 201, at 2o6.
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
246. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3 d 711, 717 (Tex. 2001).
247. See Pirruccello, supra note 201, at 215.
248. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
249. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
250. See Miller v. AT&T Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding no protection fbr illegal
activity); Abrams v. Alien, 74 N.E.2d 305, 307 (N.Y. 1947) (stating that actions against
public policy receive no protection).
213
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
category and should not receive the protection of the rule." ' In the § 1981
context, courts could evaluate defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons
for their treatment of independent contractors in the same way they currently
examine business judgments in corporate fiduciary duty suits - in other words,
by reviewing decisions for evidence of improper motives.
The principal advantage of borrowing from contract, tort, and corporate
law is that the analysis of the proposed common law claims is far more flexible
than Title VII doctrine." 2 Under the Title VII burden-shifting framework, a
plaintiff must rebut a defendant's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its action with particularized evidence of pretext. Under these
common law doctrines, however, a plaintiff must show only a violation of
community standards of decency, fairness, or reasonableness (covenant of
good faith and fair dealing), improper or malicious conduct (tortious
interference), extreme and outrageous conduct (intentional infliction of
emotional distress), or improper motive (business judgment rule). Of course,
plaintiffs still would have to meet their burden of persuasion on these matters,
and many, if not most, would be unlikely to do so. But "[i]t often will be easier
to convince a jury that a plaintiff was treated indecently, unfairly, or
unreasonably . than to prove the motivation giving rise to the
mistreatment. '  With the added flexibility of these alternative doctrines,
plaintiffs might survive summary judgment and present their evidence to fact-
finders.
Section 1981 offers a rare opportunity to innovate new doctrine for a new
type of worker. If they collaborate, Congress and the courts can bring this
project to fruition. Congress, for its part, should amend the statute to include
the types of discrimination currently covered by workplace discrimination law
and should regularize it procedurally. Then courts should work to adapt the
provision's application to the circumstances of independent contractors.
Section 1981's doctrine should reflect its unique position at the intersection of
antidiscrimination regulation and the common law.
CONCLUSION
The contracting-out phenomenon has created a new and vulnerable
population of workers: independent contractors with insecure jobs, low pay,
251. See Leonard M. Baynes, Racial Stereotypes, Broadcast Corporations, and the Business Judgment
Rule, 37 U. RICH. L. REv. 819, 871-72 (2003).
252. See Williams, supra note 201, at 228.
253. Id.
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and no rights or benefits under the federal labor and employment law regime.
Unlike their traditionally employed counterparts, they also lack the critical
protection of the widely accepted, symbolically and practically important
modern antidiscrimination laws such as Title VII. Section 1981's "make and
enforce contracts" clause creates a cause of action for some of these individuals
but leaves many of them-including women, the disabled, the elderly, and
victims of disparate impact discrimination-without recourse. Yet § 1981's
broad language and noble history leave it poised to make a greater difference in
these workers' lives. If Congress and the courts expand its coverage, regularize
its procedures, and develop its doctrine, § 1981 may provide a meaningful
safeguard for independent contractors who face discrimination in the
workplace.
Of course, full relief for these individuals must be holistic and
comprehensive, not merely legal. Advocates on behalf of contingent workers
are already engaged in extrajudicial projects (such as unionization) aimed at
securing decent and humane work experiences for independent contractors and
other contingent workers . 4 But society has recognized that the law is a
necessary ingredient in the process of bringing justice to workers. Title VII's
success s5 and the political support that led to the ADA and ADEA testify to this
fact. Moreover, legal norms shape social understanding. Independent
contractors need a strong backbone of legal antidiscrimination protection not
only as a practical means to bring and enforce claims but also as a symbol of
their dignity and equality as autonomous participants in the labor market.
Section 1981 has long been the battleground for struggles over
discrimination and the role of antidiscrimination law.2" 6 Today it stands again
at the forefront of major sociological, economic, and legal change, as courts and
legislatures struggle to apply labor and employment law to a profoundly
transformed workplace. Yet during this era of flux, the mission of the framers
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 remains both timely and fundamentally
important. As in 1866, individuals today suffer at the hands of those with
whom they contract because of characteristics they cannot control and for
which society has decided they should not be denied opportunity. With careful
and considered updates, § 1981 may again become a powerful practical and
symbolic tool for eradicating discrimination.
254. See Patricia Ball, The New Traditional Employment Relationship: An Examination of Proposed
Legal and Structural Reforms for Contingent Workers from the Perspectives of Involuntary
Impermanent Workers and Those Who Employ Them, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 931-38
(2003); Middleton, supra note 58, at 589-613.
255. See supra note 194.
256. See Rutherglen, supra note 79, at 351-52.
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